We prove the superhedging duality for a discrete-time financial market with proportional transaction costs under portfolio constraints and model uncertainty. 
Introduction
It is more often the rule, rather than the exception, that socio-economics phenomena are influenced by a strong component of randomness. Starting from the pioneering work of Knight (see e.g. [21] ) a distinction between risk and uncertainty has been widely accepted with respect to the nature of such a randomness. We often call a situation risky if a probabilistic description is available (e.g. the toss of a fair coin). In contrast, we call a situation uncertain if it cannot be fully described in probabilistic terms. Simple reasons could be the absence of an objective model (e.g. the result of a horse race; see [6] and the references therein) or the lack of information (e.g. the draw from an urn whose composition is unknown). The classical literature in mathematical finance has been mainly focusing on risk and the attention to problems of Knightian uncertainty has been drawn only relative recently starting from [4] . In particular, fundamental topics such as the theory of arbitrage and the related superhedging duality have been systematically studied in frictionless discrete-time markets in [8, 12] in a quasi-sure framework and in [1, 15, 17] in a pointwise framework.
Under risk, the classical model of a discrete-time market with proportional transaction costs has been introduced in [20] . The model is described by a collection of cones K := {Kt}t=0,...,T which determines: i) admissible strategies; ii) solvency requirements; iii) pricing mechanisms. More precisely, the latter are called consistent price systems and they are essentially martingale processes taking values in the dual cones K * tP -q.s.at each time. Similarly to [11] , we finally prove that the desired duality can be deduced from duality results in frictionless market. In particular, we use here those of [8] , which takes into account possible portfolio constraints.
We conclude the introduction by specifying the frequently used notation and the setup. The superhedging duality is stated in Section 2. The construction of the fictitious frictionless market is the content of Section 3. Finally, we prove the main result in Section 4 where we also show how it extends to semi-static trading.
Notation. For a topological space X, BX is the Borel sigma-algebra. P(X) is the class of all probability measures on (X, BX ) and δx denotes the Dirac measure on x ∈ X. For a probability measure P and a set R ⊂ P(X) we say that P ≪ R if there existsP ∈ R such that P ≪P. A property is said to hold R-q.s. if it holds for any P ∈ R.
A G-measurable map U , defined on a space X and taking values in the power set of a space Y , is called a multifunction (or random set) and it is denoted by U : X ⇒ Y . L 0 (G; U ) denotes the class of G-measurable selectors of U which are defined on dom U := {x ∈ X | U (x) = ∅}. For U : X1 × X2 ⇒ R d and x ∈ X1 fixed, the notation U (x; ·) refers to the random set U viewed as a (multi)function of X2. Given a class of probabilities R ⊂ P(X2), the (conditional) quasi-sure support of U (x; ·), denoted by supp R U (x; ·), is the smallest closed set F ⊂ R d such that U (x; ·) ⊂ F , R-q.s. For a collection of random sets U := (Ut) T t=0 adapted to a filtration G, we denote by L 0 (G−; U ) the class of processes H such that Ht+1 ∈ L 0 (Gt; Ut) for every t = 0, . . . T − 1. Finally, for two R d -valued processes H and S, we set (H • S)t := t−1 u=0 Hu+1 · (Su+1 − Su).
Setup. Let T ∈ N be a fixed time horizon and I := {0, . . . T }. For later use we also define I−1 := {−1, . . . , T − 1}. We consider a filtered space (Ω, F, F u , F, F u ) endowed with a (possibly non-dominated) class of priors P ⊂ P(Ω) described as follows.
-Ω1 is a given Polish space. We choose Ω := ΩT , where Ωt denotes the (t + 1)-fold product of Ω1. Any ω ∈ Ωt is denoted by ω = (ω0, . . . , ωt) with ωs ∈ Ω1 for any 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
-We set F := BΩ and F u its universal completion. Similarly, the filtrations F = {Ft}t∈I and F u = {F u t }t∈I are given by Ft := BΩ t and F u t its universal completion. -for each t ∈ I, Pt is a random set of probabilities on Ω1 with analytic graph and P0 is non-random. We set, P = {P0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ PT −1 | Pt ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Pt), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}},
The class L 0 (F u t ; Pt) is non-empty from Jankov-Von Neumann Theorem (see [10, Proposition 7 .49]) so that P is well defined through Fubini's Theorem.
Main result
We consider the general model of financial markets with proportional transaction costs introduced in [20] . The model is fully described by a collection of random convex closed cones K := {Kt}t∈I ⊂ R d with d ≥ 2, called solvency cones. These represent the sets of positions, in terms of physical units of d underlying assets, which can be liquidated in the zero portfolio at zero cost. We assume that any position with non-negative coordinates is solvent, i.e., R d + ⊂ Kt. The set −Kt represents the class of portfolios which are available at zero cost. We assume that Kt is Ft-measurable for any t ∈ I with K0 non-random. Following standard notation, for a cone
We generalize the model of [20] by introducing some constraints on the admissible positions in the market. These are modeled by a collection C := {Ct}t∈I ⊂ R d of random convex closed cones such that every Ct is Ft-measurable. A zero-cost strategy η := (ηt)t∈I is said to be admissible if it satisfies ηt ∈ At for any t ∈ I, where
−ks with ks ∈ Ks, P-q.s. ∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ t .
In words, η satisfies the constraints impose by (Ct)t∈I and it is obtained as the sum of portfolios which are available at zero cost. We denote by H K the class of admissible strategies and omit the dependence on C as it will be fixed throughout the paper. Assumption 2.1. We assume that int(K * t ) = ∅ for any t ∈ I. Moreover, we assume that Ct ⊂ Ct+1 for any t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
The first assumption is known as efficient friction hypothesis. The second one means that it is allowed to not trade between two periods. The latter is obviously satisfied in the unconstrained case, that is Ct ≡ R d for any t ∈ I.
The following is called No Strict Arbitrage condition in the literature.
The interpretation is that (Z, Q) defines a frictionless arbitrage-free price process which is compatible with the model of transaction costs defined by {(Kt, Ct)}t∈I. We shortly denote by S the set of SCPS and by S 0 the class of normalized SCPS, namely, those satisfying Z d t = 1 for any t ∈ I.
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper. Let G : Ω ⇒ R d be a Borel measurable random vector which represents the terminal payoff of an option in terms of physical units of the underlying assets. The superhedging price of G is given by 
Moreover, the superhedging price is attained when π K (G) < ∞.
The proof of Theorem 2.4 is given in Section 4. The main difficulty is to establish Theorem 2.4 when only dynamic trading is allowed. In Theorem 4.12 below we extend the duality to the case where also buy and hold positions in a finite number of options are allowed.
In the following it would be more convenient to extend the original market with an extra unconstrained component. More precisely, one could consider the marketK withKt := Kt ×R+ andCt := Ct × R for t ∈ I, which also satisfies Assumption 2.1. It is easy to see that
Remark 2.5. Without loss of generality, we may assume that (Kt, Ct) are already in the form described above, for any t ∈ I.
We adapt some results of [7] to the case of portfolio constraint. These will be useful in the next sections. Consider the collection of random setsK := {Kt}t∈I, defined via a backward recursion as follows. We letK *
where, for ω ∈ Ωt fixed, Γt(ω) := supp Pt(ω)K * t+1 (ω; ·). We defineKt as the dual ofK * t for any t ∈ I.
The following are generalizations of Lemma 6 and Proposition 4 in [7] to the present setting. The proofs are analogous and we postpone them to the Appendix. Lemma 2.6.K * t has analytic graph for every t ∈ I. Proposition 2.7. If K satisfies Assumption 2.1 and NA s (P), the same holds forK. In particular, int(K * t ) = ∅ P-q.s. for all t ∈ I.
The randomization approach
In this section we construct an enlarged measurable space (Ω,F,F u ,F,F u ) endowed with a suitable class of probabilitiesP. On this space, we construct a price processŜ = (Ŝt)t∈I which represent a frictionless financial market with the property thatŜt ∈K * tP -q.s. for any t ∈ I (Corollary 3.5 below) and which is arbitrage free (Proposition 3.9 below).
We chooseΩ1 := Ω1 × R d−1 and setΩ =ΩT , whereΩt denotes the (t + 1)-fold product of Ω1. We endowΩ with the filtrationF := {Ft}t∈I, whereFt := Ft ⊗ B R d−1 , for every t ∈ I, and we denote byF u the universal completion ofF. Similarly,F := BΩ andF u is its universal completion. We shortly denote (ω, θ) ∈Ωt for an element of the form (ω0, . . . , ωt, θ0, . . . , θt) with ωs ∈ Ω1 and θs ∈ R d−1 , for s = 0, . . . , t. The collection of constraints extends toΩ in the obvious way. Since there is no source of confusion, we still denote them by C = {Ct}t∈I.
We next construct the price processŜ. Recall that, for any t ∈ I, Kt is Borel-measurable and, thus, also K *
+ we can normalize St with respect to, e.g., the last component, so that St takes values in
We define a Borel-measurable price processŜ as,
where the last component serves as a numéraire. The rest of the section is devoted to the construction of the desired set of probability measureŝ P. For every t ∈ I, we define the random sets
Lemma 3.1. For every t ∈ I, Θt has an analytic graph.
Proof. In the proof we will repeatedly use the fact that the class of analytic sets is closed under countable union and intersection and that the image of an analytic set through a Borel-measurable function is again analytic.
Step 1. For any t ∈ I, consider the random setK
t ) where the projection is taken over the first d − 1 coordinates andK * ,0 t is the analogous of (3.1) forK. Observe that,
From Lemma 2.6, graph(K * t ) is analytic and so is the intersection in (3.4). As the projection is a continuous map, we conclude that graph(K * ,d−1 t ) is analytic.
Step 2. We now show that the set
is analytic, for an arbitrary v ∈ R d−1 and t ∈ I. This together with Lemma 5.1 in the Appendix yields the claim, as graph(Θt) is the intersection of countably many analytic sets of the from A v t .
Observe that the function f : 
Proof. The graph of δΘ t is the image of the graph of Θt through the map (ω, θ) → (ω, δ θ ) which is an embedding (see [3, Theorem 15.8] ). Since the image of an analytic set through a continuous function is again analytic, the thesis follows.
For t ∈ {0, . . . T − 1} we define the random setŝ
Moreover, we extend the definition to t = −1 by settingP−1 := {P ∈ P(Ω1) |P(graph Θ0) = 1} which is a non-random set as K0 is itself non-random. Proof. Fix t ∈ I−1. For ease of notation, denote At+1 := graph Θt+1, which is analytic from Lemma 3.1. The function 1A t+1 : Ωt ×Ω1 → R is, thus, upper semianalytic. It is not difficult to show that the function φ : Ωt × P(Ω1) → R such that φ(ω,P) = EP[1A t+1 (ω; ·)] is upper semianalytic (see proof of [12, Lemma 4.10]). As a consequence the set
is analytic as φ is upper semianalytic. In particular, the thesis follows for t = −1.
Recall that the map πΩ 1 : P(Ω1) → P(Ω1), which associate, to everŷ P ∈ P(Ω1), its marginal on Ω1 is Borel measurable (see [3, Theorem 15.14] ). Therefore, as in the proof of [11, Lemma 2.12 (i)], the set
is also analytic. To conclude observe that graph(Pt) is the intersection of the two previous sets.
We now such that this class is non-empty on a sufficiently rich set of events.
Lemma 3.4. Assume NA s (P). For any t ∈ I−1, the set Nt := {ω ∈ Ωt |Pt(ω) = ∅} is a universally measurable P-polar set. In particular, the same holds for N := ∪t∈I −1 Nt.
Proof. Fix t ∈ I−1. For t = −1 there is nothing to show as Θ0 is non-random and non-empty from Proposition 2.7. Suppose 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Let Dt+1 := dom(Θt+1) which is analytic from Lemma 3.1. As in the proof of Proposition 3.3, the function φ : Ωt × P(Ω1) → R such that φ(ω, P) = E P [1D t+1 (ω; ·)] is upper semianalytic. We deduce that the set
is analytic and, thus, also its projection on Ωt. Denote by
To see this observe that
is P-polar from Proposition 2.7. Suppose that there exists P ∈ P such that P(N ′ t ) > 0 and denote by {Pt}t∈I its disintegration. By definition of Bt, Pt(ω, D C t+1 ) > 0 for every ω ∈ N ′ t , therefore, the random variable
It remains to show that
C , we can extend δ θ t+1 arbitrarily on the complement of dom(Θt+1) and, with a slight abuse of notation, we still denote it by δ θ t+1 . The product measure Pt ⊗ δ θ t+1 belongs toPt(ω) for any
C ⊂ (Nt) C and the thesis follows.
Proof. It follows from the fact that Pt ⊗ δ θ t+1 belongs toPt for any δ θ t+1 ∈ L 0 (F u t+1 ; δΘ t+1 ) and Pt a measurable selector of Bt in (3.6).
Corollary 3.5 shows that the role of the parameter θ for the price processŜ is to "span" the dual cones given by the backward recursion (2.3).
We setP
, ∀t ∈ I−1}, The class is well defined and constructed via Fubini's Theorem as done for P. Indeed, from Lemma 3.4, the set Nt is P-polar, thus, we can extend arbitrarily anyPt to a universally measurable kernel which, with a slight abuse of notation, we still denote byPt.
By construction, we have that the probability of the set of trajectories taking values in the interior ofK * t is equal to 1, i.e.,
We finally show that starting from a model (K, P) satisfying NA s (P), the induced frictionless market (Ŝ,P) satisfies the no arbitrage condition of Definition 3.7 below. Definition 3.6. We say that a process H is an admissible strategy if Ht+1 ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Ct) and the self-financing condition (Ht+1 − Ht) ·Ŝt = 0P-q.s. is satisfied, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. The class of admissible strategies is denoted byĤ r .
In order to use the frictionless duality results of [8] we need to verify Assumption 3.1 and 5.1 in that paper. Note that the set Ht, in the notation of [8] , corresponds to the set of constraints Ct considered here. Under NA s (P), Corollary 3.5 and Proposition 2.7, imply that
where, for a set U ⊂ R d , span(U ) denotes its linear hull. We deduce that the sets Ht, Ht(P) and CH t (P) in [8] , they all coincideP-q.s. with the first d − 1 components of the set Ct. Since Ct is a convex closed cone, Assumption 3.1 i)-ii) and 5.1 i) are met. By [8, Remark 5.2] it is sufficient to verify Assumption 5.1 ii). In particular we show that
is Borel-measurable. To see this observe that D := {(ω,P) | EP|∆Ŝt(ω; ·)| < ∞} is Borelmeasurable asŜ is Borel-measurable (see, e.g., the proof of [12, Lemma 4.10]). Moreover, the function F ((ω,P), x) := x · EP[∆Ŝt(ω; ·)] is a Charathéodory map, namely, it is continuous in x when (ω,P) are fixed and it is measurable in (ω,P) when x is fixed. From [22, Example 14.15] , the random set F ((ω,P), Ct(ω)) is again Borel-measurable. Finally, At restricted to D is again Borel-measurable since, for any c ∈ R,
The following is Theorem 3.2 of [8] which is also valid in our context. For ω ∈ Ωt fixed, NA(Pt(ω)) corresponds to NA(P) for the one period market (Ŝt(ω),Ŝt+1(ω; ·)). 
iii) for any P ∈P there exists Q ∈Q such that P ≪ Q.
Proof. The only difference from the proof of [8, Theorem 3.2] is thatPt(ω) might have empty values on the P-polar set Nt ∈ F u . Recall graphPt is analytic by Proposition 3.3. Thus, also
). In our framework, the above set has to be intersected with dom(Pt) which is analytic and, therefore, the intersection is again universally measurable. The same proof yields that N ′ t is P-polar. ii) ⇒ iii) is based on [8, Lemma 3.4] . The universally measurable kernels Qt defining Q ∈Q are constructed outside a P-polar set and, in particular, they are chosen as selectors of a set Ξ with dom(Ξ) = (N ′ t )
C . In our framework, the same Ξ satisfies dom(Ξ) = (Nt ∪ N ′ t ) C , which is still universally measurable and P-polar. The same proof allows to conclude. iii) ⇒ i) is standard.
Proof. Fix t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. From Theorem 3.8, we only need to show that NA s (P) implies that the set N ′ t isP-polar. Suppose that there exists H ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Ct), such that
From Corollary 3.5, H(ω) (weakly) separates the singleton {Ŝt(ω)} from supp Pt(ω)K * t+1 (ω; ·) for anyω in the complementary of aP-polar set. Such a separation extends to the closed convex hull At(ω) := conv(Γt(ω)), with the notation of (2.3). We can thus rewrite
Finally, (2.3) implies that int(K * t ) ⊂ int(At + C * t ). We deduce that
By Corollary 3.5,Ŝt ∈ int(K * t )P-q.s., thus, {ω ∈Ωt | H(ω) = 0} isP-polar.
The Superhedging duality
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.4. To this aim we compare both the primal and the dual problem with the randomized counterpart in the frictionless market induced byŜ and constructed in Section 3. Using duality results known for the frictionless case we obtain the result.
Equality of the primal problems. We first observe that using admissible strategies with respect to K or with respect toK yields the same superhedging price.
Proof. Since Kt ⊂Kt for any t ∈ I, the inequality (≥) is trivial. Let now (y,η) ∈ R × HK be a superhedge for G. We show that there exists η ∈ H K such that ηT =ηT and, thus, (y, η) is a superhedge for G. By definition, we can writeηT = T t=0 −kt for somekt ∈ L 0 (F u t ;Kt), for any t ∈ I. We observe that, from (2.3),
Iterating the same procedure up to time T − 1 and recalling thatKT = KT we obtain that
Moreover, g 
We are only left to show that ηt ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Ct) for any t ∈ I. To this aim observe that for t = T it follows from ηT =ηT . For t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we have where, for the second equality we exchanged the order of summation in the first term and used the definition of g By construction, g s t ∈ Ct P-q.s. Moreover, the admissibility ofη implies thatηt ∈ Ct P-q.s. By recalling that Ct is a convex cone, the thesis follows.
We now consider the superhedging problem in the frictionless market defined byŜ. Note that a trading strategy inĤ r (see Definition 3.6) could in principle depend on the variable θ. As this variable is only fictitious a genericF u -predictable process cannot consistently identify an element in H K . To this aim we need to reduce the class of admissible strategies to those which only depend on the variable ω. 
We denote byĤ the set of all self-financing consistent strategies. Depending on the choice of the admissible strategies, two corresponding superhedging prices of a random variable g can be computed in the enlarged market:
We want to show that the superhedging price of G is equal to the superhedging price of G ·ŜT in the frictionless market, using only consistent strategies.
Towards this aim, let us first elaborate on the self-financing condition for consistent strategies. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T −1, let ∆Ht := Ht+1 −Ht and define F (ω, 
We also observe that the self-financing condition (4.1) can be rewritten as follows.
where the second equality follows from Corollary 3.5. Define
t ({∞}). Lemma 4.4. Let P ∈ P, H ∈Ĥ.
• Suppose that P(A ∞ ) > 0. Then, for any ∀n ∈ N, there existsP n ∈P such thatP
Then, for any n ∈ N, there existsP n ∈P such thatP
Proof. For a fixed P, we might take a Borel-measurable version of H (and therefore of φt). For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, we define the Charathéodory mapF (ω, θ) := F (ω,Ŝt(ω, θ)) with F as above but with the difference that now F is Borel-measurable in ω. From [22, Example 14.15 b)], the random sets
are Borel-measurable and, therefore, they have Borel-measurable graph. By intersecting their graphs with graph(Θt) we obtain two analytic sets. The Jankov-Von Neumann Theorem provides the existence of universally measurable selectorsθ
respectively. If P(A ∞ t ) > 0 for some 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 we letθt =θ ∞ t and, for s = t, we letθs be an arbitrary selector of Θs. If P(A ∞ ) = 0 we letθt =θ <∞ t for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 andθT an arbitrary selector of ΘT . Since P is fixed, we take Borel measurable versions of the above selectors.
In both cases, recalling that the map θ → δ θ is an embedding of R d into P(R d ), we construct a probability measureP n from the collection of kernelŝ Pt(ω0, . . . , ωt; ω ′ , θ ′ ) := Pt(ω0, . . . , ωt; dω
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and extend it toP−1 := P−1 ⊗ δθ 0 for an arbitrary P−1 ∈ P(Ω1). The constructedP n satisfiesP n | Ω = P and the desired properties.
Lemma 4.5. πK(G) =π(G ·ŜT ).
Proof. The inequality (≥).
If the set of superhedging strategies for G is empty, then πK(G) = ∞ and the inequality holds trivially. Suppose that (y, η) ∈ R × HK is a superhedge for G. Define Ht+1 := ηt for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. SinceKT is a convex cone and ηT − ηT −1 ∈ −KT by admissibility, we have that
For any ω outside a P-polar set and for any st ∈K * ,0
where the second inequality follows from kt ∈Kt for any t ∈ I, P-q.s. Recalling that, from (3.7) we haveŜt ∈K * tP -q.s., it follows y + (H •Ŝ)T ≥ G ·ŜTP-q.s. It remains to show that, without loss of generality, η can be chosen such that H is admissible. From η ∈ HK we have that ∆Ht = ηt − ηt−1 ∈ −Kt = (−K * t )
* . In particular, this implies ∆Ht ·Ŝt ≤ 0P-q.s. and, therefore,
Consider the new strategyη withηt = ηt − e d t u=0 δu for t ∈ I. Since ∆H Moreover, using again (4.4), we also have (ηt −ηt−1) · x ≤ 0 for any x ∈K * ,0 t , which impliesηt −ηt−1 ∈ −Kt. Finally,ηt ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Ct) since it coincide with ηt on the first d − 1 coordinates and the last one is unconstrained (see Remark 2.5). We conclude by observing that
The inequality (≤). If the set of superhedging strategies for G ·ŜT is empty, thenπ(G ·ŜT ) = ∞ and the inequality holds trivially. Suppose that (y, H) ∈ R×Ĥ is a superhedge for G·ŜT . We set kT := 0, kt := Ht − Ht+1 and ηt := x ∈K * ,0 t , which implies kt(ω) ∈Kt(ω). We now rewrite the superhedging property of (y, H) in terms of (y, η). For any (ω, θ) outside aP-polar set, we have
(4.5)
We claim that this implies:
To prove the claim observe that the first term in (4.5) depends on θ only through the last component θT , whereas, the second term in (4.5) depends only on the first T − 1 components of θ.
Fix n ∈ N, P ∈ P. From Lemma 4.4 and (4.4), there existsP n ∈P such thatP n | Ω = P and
Since n ∈ N and P ∈ P are arbitrary, we deduce that (4.6) holds and the claim is proven.
It remains to show that for
Suppose that, by contradiction, there exists a set A and a probability P ∈ P such that P(A) > 0 and ξ(ω) / ∈KT (ω) for any ω ∈ A. Without loss of generality, we may take a Borel measurable version of ξ. Recall thatKT = KT is assumed to be Borel measurable, so that Take alsoθt a selector of Θt, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. For any of the above selectors, we take a Borel measurable version. Consider now the probability measureP ∈P obtained from the kernelsP
withP−1 := P−1 ⊗ δθ 0 for an arbitrary P−1 ∈ P(Ω1). Note thatP ∈P andP |Ω = P. By construction,P (ξ ·ŜT < 0) ≥ P(A) > 0, which contradicts the hypothesis.
Equality of the dual problems. for t = 0, . . . T − 1. Analogously, the set of normalized SCPSS 0 for the marketK is composed of couples (Z, Q) for which the disintegration (Qt)t=0,...T −1 of Q satisfies EQ t |∆Zt(ω; ·)| < ∞ and EQ t [y · ∆Zt] ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Ct(ω), (4.8) for t = 0, . . . T − 1.
Proposition 4.6. For any random vector
Proof. Suppose that (Z, Q) ∈S 0 . By construction,Ŝt is a Charathéodory map. From the implicit mapping theorem (see [22, Theorem 14.16] ), there exists an F-adapted process (θt)t∈I with θt : Ωt → R d−1 and such thatŜ t(ω, θt(ω)) = Zt(ω). (4.10)
Denote by (Qt)t∈I −1 the collection of conditional probabilities of Q given Ft−1, extended to t = −1 with an arbitrary Q−1 ∈ P(Ω1). We use δ θt as a stochastic kernel and construct the probabilityQ :
Since (Z, Q) satisfies (4.8) and (4.10) holds, we deduce that thatQ ∈Q. Moreover,
Conversely, suppose thatQ ∈Q. We define (Z, Q) as Q :=Q | Ω and Zt := EQ[Ŝt | Ft] for any t ∈ I. Denote by (Qt)t∈I −1 (respectively (Qt)t∈I −1 ) the disintegration ofQ (respectively of Q). From EQ t [y·∆Ŝt+1(ω; ·)] ≤ 0 for any y ∈ Ct and from the fact that Ct is Ft-measurable, we deduce that Qt satisfies (4.8) for any t = 0, . . . , T −1. Moreover, sinceQ ≪P, by definition ofP we obtain: i) Q ≪ P and ii) Zt takes values in int(K * t ) Q-a.s. for any t ∈ I. We conclude that (Z, Q) ∈S 0 . Moreover, we obviously have
Proof of Theorem 2.4.
We are now ready to prove the main result of the section. Note that from Lemma 4.1 and 4.5, we can only deduce the equality of the primal problems if one restricts to consistent trading in the enlarged market (compare with (4.3)). It remain to show that the same price is obtained with randomized strategies as defined in (4.2), in other words, we need to prove thatπ(G ·ŜT ) = π r (G ·ŜT ). Denote by U SA(Ωt, t) the class of g :Ωt → R upper semianalytic functions which depends on θ only through θt, i.e.,
The one-period case. We obtain first the results for T = 1 which will constitute the building blocks for the general case.
Proposition 4.7. Suppose T = 1 and g ∈ U SA(ΩT , T ). If NA(P) holds true, thenπ(g) = π r (g).
Proof. The inequalityπ(g) ≥π r (g) is trivial. For the converse, let Bn(0) be the closed ball in R d with center in 0 and radius n ∈ N. The intersectionK * ,0 0
Recall the definition ofP0 from (3.5) and let P−1 ∈ P(Ω1) be arbitrary 1 . We definê
Denote byπn andπ r n the analogous ofπ andπ r in equations (4.2) and (4.3) withP n replacinĝ P and note that, by construction, {πn(g)}n and {π r n (g)}n are increasing sequences bounded from above byπ(g) andπ r (g) respectively. We use now a minimax argument as in [11] to deduce thatπ
1 Recall that the coneK * ,0 0 is non-random. Thus, in the enlarged market, the only relevant variable is θ.
To justify the above it is sufficient to observe that the function
is convex in H for θ fixed and affine in θ for H fixed. We can thus apply the minimax theorem of [23, Corollary 2] .
Ifπ r (g) ≥ limn→∞π r n (g) = ∞, thenπ r (g) ≥π(g) holds trivially and the proof is complete. Suppose the limit is finite. Let ε > 0 be arbitrary and, for any n ∈ N, let Hn ∈ C0 be an ε-optimal strategy forπn(g), namely,
for any (ω, θ1) outside aP0-polar set and for any θ0 ∈ O n . If the sequence {Hn} n∈N ⊂ C0 is bounded, it admits a convergent subsequence. Denote byH its limit. From (4.11),
We show now that if {Hn} n∈N ⊂ C0 is unbounded, it contradicts NA(P). This together with ε > 0 arbitrary yields the desired inequality.
To see this divide by cn := Hn both sides of (4.11). Sinceπn(g) =π r n (g) is assumed to be bounded,πn(g)/cn converges to 0. Hn/cn belongs to the compact sphere of R d , thus, there existsH with H = 1 such that Hn/cn →H (up to extracting a subsequence). Note that H ∈ C0 since C0 is a closed cone. By the same argument as above, this implies,
Recalling (3.7), the condition NA(P) impliesH = 0, which is a contradiction since H = 1. This concludes the proof.
Note that if G : Ω → R d is a Borel-measurable vector, G·ŜT :Ω → R is a Borel-measurable function which depends on θ only through θT . In particular Proposition 4.7, together with Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.5, yields πK (G) =π r (G ·ŜT ).
Proof of Theorem 2.4 for T = 1. From Proposition 3.9, NA s (P) implies NA(P) for the enlarged market. From Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.5 and Proposition 4.7, π K (G) =π r (G ·ŜT ) which is the superhedging price of G ·ŜT , in the enlarged market. We show that
Indeed, the second equality follows from [8, Theorem 4.3] after observing that, when C0 is a cone, A Q in the aforementioned paper is finite if and only ifQ ∈Q. The third equality follows from Proposition 4.6 and the last inequality follows fromS 0 ⊂ S 0 . The converse inequality follows from standard arguments. From [8, Theorem 4.3] an optimal superhedging strategy exists in the enlarged market, when the price is finite. The proofs of Lemma 4.1 and 4.5 provide the construction of an optimal strategy in the original market.
The multi-period case. From [8, Lemma 3.4],Qt as in (4.7) has analytic graph for every
(4.12) 13) with Θt as in (3.3) . It is possible to show that gt ∈ U SA(Ωt, t). Indeed, the measurability property follows exactly from the same argument as in the first lines of the proof of [12, Lemma 4.10] . Moreover, gt depends on θ only throughŜt, thus, only through θt (see (3.2) LetPt be the set of probabilities on Ωt × R d−1 ×Ω1 given bỹ
Recall that the random setsPt and δΘ from Corollary 3.2 have analytic graph. Since the map x → δx is an embedding and the map (P, Q) → P ⊗ Q is continuous (see [10, Lemma 7.12] ), it follows that alsoPt has analytic graph.
is a universally measurable normal integrand.
Proof. Denote by fP(ω, h, x) the functions on the right hand side of (4.14) for which the supremum is taken. From [22, Corollary 14 .41] we need to check:
is universally measurable, where Bε(x) denotes the closed ball of radius ε centerd in x.
a) Since fP(ω, h, ·) is continuous for everyP and the pointwise supremum of continuous functions is lower semi-continuous, the claim follows. b) Consider an arbitrary ε > 0. We first show that for any (ω, h),
This follows from the application of a minimax Theorem (see e.g. [23, Corollary 2] ). Bε(x) is a compact set and, for fixedx, the map fP(ω, h,x) is linear (hence concave) inP. On the other hand {P ≪Pt(ω)} is a convex set and, for fixedP, the map fP(ω, h,x) is affine (hence convex) and continuous inx.
We can rewrite infx ∈Bε(x) fP(ω, h,x) = f1(ω, h,P) + f2(ω,P) where
f1 is an upper semi-analytic function on Ω × R d × P(Ω) (see [12, Lemma 4.10] ). We claim that f2 is a Borel-measurable function (hence upper semi-analytic). Given the claim we observe that f1 + f2 is again upper semi-analytic. Moreover, by the same argument for the measurability of (4.13) above, we can conclude that Ψε = supP ≪Pt(ω) (f1 + f2) is upper semi-analytic on Ω × R d and therefore universally measurable. This prove b).
To conclude the proof it is enough to show that f2 is Borel measurable. To see this observe that the function E P [x · (Ŝt+1(ω; ·) −Ŝt(ω; ·))] is measurable in (ω, P) and continuous inx, namely, it is a Carathéodory map. From [22, Example 14.15] its composition with Bε(x) yields a Borel-measurable random set A such that sup A = −f2. To conclude, observe that for an arbitrary c ∈ R,
is a Borel set from the measurability of A.
Remark 4.9. Note that, for any ω ∈ Ωt, the right hand side of (4.14) is equal to the inf{K ∈ R | X ≤ KPt(ω)-q.s}, where X is the random variable inside the expectation. In particular, this is equal to the minimal amount, at time t, for which the strategy x is a superhedge for gt+1 given that h is the strategy used at time t − 1. Moreover, by construction ofPt, the strategy x with the initial amount f (ω, h, x), is a (conditional) superhedging strategy which depends only on the event ω and not on the event (ω, θ). In the terminology of Definition 4.2, this construction provides consistent strategies.
Recall that NA(Pt(ω)) is the conditional version of NA(P) (see Theorem 3.8).
Proposition 4.10. Let 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and assume NA(Pt(ω)). There exists a universally measurable map ϕ :
Proof. Define the consistent conditional superhedging price of gt+1 given (ω, h) as the map 
)} is a closed-valued universally measurable random set. The desired ϕ is any measurable selector of Ψ (which exists from, e.g. [22, Corollary 14.6 
]).
Proof of Theorem 2.4 for T > 1. We first show that for any g ∈ U SA(ΩT , T ), Denote byπu the (consistent) superhedging price if the terminal time is u. In particular,πT =π defined in (4.3). Let gt+1 ∈ U SA(Ωt+1, t + 1) and define gt and g ′ t as in (4.12) and (4.13) respectively. We claim thatπt+1(gt+1) ≤πt(gt). Denote byP |t the restriction ofP toΩt. Similarly forQ |t . Consider an arbitrary (y, H) ∈ R ×Ĥ r satisfying y + (H ·Ŝ)t ≥ gtP |t -q.s. By rewriting the previous inequality we observe that y + (H ·Ŝ)t−1 − Ht ·Ŝt−1 ≥ gt − Ht ·Ŝt,P |t -q.s. which, in turn, implies
Given the strategy (y, H1, . . . , Ht), Proposition 4.10 provides a universally measurable random vector Ht+1 = ϕ(·, Ht) such that the strategy (y, H1, . . . , Ht, Ht+1) satisfies y + (H ·Ŝ)t+1 ≥ gt+1P-q.s. From (y, H) above being arbitrary, the claim is proven. We deduce that πt+1(gt+1) ≤πt(gt) =π r t (gt) = sup
where the equalities follow from the inductive hypothesis and the second inequality follows from a standard pasting argument. By definition,π r t+1 (gt+1) ≤πt+1(gt+1), moreover, the inequality supQ ∈Q EQ[gt+1] ≤π r t+1 (gt+1) is standard. We conclude that (4.15) holds for T = t + 1.
We now choose g = G ·ŜT , which is Borel-measurable by assumption. From Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.5, Proposition 4.6 and (4.15), we deduce
Again, the converse inequality follows by standard arguments and the duality follows (recall also the discussion before Remark 2.5). Finally, the attainment property in the frictionless market follows from [8, Theorem 6.1]. The proofs of Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.5 provide the construction of an optimal strategy in the original market.
The case with options.
We now consider the case where a finite number of options ϕ1, . . . , ϕe are available for semistatic trading. In this section we show that this case can be embedded in the previous one. For any k = 1, . . . , e, we assume that ϕ k : Ω → R d is a Borel-measurable function representing the terminal payoff of an option, in terms of physical units of an underlying d-dimensional asset. Any ϕ k has bid and ask price at time 0 denoted, respectively, by b k and a k . We set Φ := [ϕ1; · · · ; ϕe; −ϕ1; · · · ; −ϕe] with corresponding prices p := (a1, . . . , ae, −b1, . . . , −be)
T . Φ takes values in R d×m and p ∈ R m with m := 2e. For ease of notation we relabel the options and incorporate their price in the payoff so that
In addition, we suppose that we are given a dynamic trading market (K, C) satisfying all the hypothesis of Section 2. An admissible strategy is of the formη := (η, α) with η ∈ H K a dynamic strategy and α ∈ R m + . Definition 4.11. We say that NA Moreover, the superhedging price is attained when π K,Φ (G) < ∞.
As in Section 3, we construct an extended space where only dynamic trading in a frictionless assetS is allowed. We setΩ1 =Ω1 × R m andΩ =ΩT withΩt the (t + 1)-fold product ofΩ1. We defineSt :Ωt → R d × R m such that
• On the first d components:St(ω, θ, x) =Ŝt(ω, θ);
• On the last m components:St(ω, θ, x) = x for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, and
The set of priorsP is obtained from the collectionPt :=Pt ⊗ P(R m ). The set of constraints in the frictionless market is obtained as C × R m + . The set of randomized and consistent strategies in the frictionless market are defined as before and denoted here asH r andH. Similarly for the corresponding superhedging pricesπ r andπ. We here define the semi-static consistent superhedging price asπ We only need to show the following. Take now ξ a measurable selector of {x ∈ R m | x · ht +1 < 0}. This exists from [7, as the random set corresponds to the interior of the polar cone of ht +1 . Since P is fixed we might take a Borel-measurable version of ξ. Let (Pt)t=0,...,T −1 be the kernel decomposition of P, extended arbitrarily to t = −1. Fix x ∈ R m and δ θt an arbitrary selector of δΘ t from Corollary 3.2, for any t ∈ I. For any λ > 0, define the probability kernels where the first equality follows by (2.3) and the second equality follows from [7, Lemma 16] . We start with the case r ≥ t + 1. From [7, Lemma 8] , we havekt = kt + λt for some kt ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Kt) and λt ∈ L 0 (F u t ;Kt+1 ∩ Ct). We can therefore rewrite ηr = −k0 − . . . − kt−1 − (kt + λt) −kt+1 − . . . −kr,
Define the new strategyη withηs = ηs for any s = t andηt := ηt−1 − kt = ηt + λt.
Since ηt, λt+1 ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Ct) and Ct is a convex cone, the sum takes also values in Ct, from whichηt ∈ At(K t+1 ). In particular,η is admissible for the market K t+1 and satisfiesηr ∈ Ar(K t+1 ) ∩ L 0 (F u r ;Kr) From the inductive hypothesis of strict no arbitrage, it follows that ηr = ηr = 0 P-q.s. For the case r = t, by assumption ηt ∈ L 0 (F u r ;Kt). Similarly as above, we can rewrite ηt = ξt + λt for some ξt ∈ L 0 (F u t ; Kt) and λt ∈ L 0 (F u t ;Kt+1 ∩ Ct) and, hence, λt = −k0 − . . . − kt−1 − ξt. This implies
where the inclusion follow from Assumption 2.1. The strict no arbitrage condition implies λt = 0 P-q.s. and therefore ηt = ξt P-q.s. As a consequence, ηt ∈ A(K t+1 ) ∩ L 0 (F u t ; Kt). Using again the strict no arbitrage condition, it follows ηt = 0.
